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Abstract
Background: Worldwide, the public health community has recognized the growing problem of
childhood obesity. But, unlike tobacco control policy, there is little evidence about what public
policies would work to substantially reduce childhood obesity. Public health leaders currently tend
to support traditional "command and control" schemes that order private enterprises and
governments to stop or start doing specific things that, is it hoped, will yield lower childhood
obesity rates. These include measures such as 1) taking sweetened beverages out of schools, 2)
posting calorie counts on fast-food menu boards, 3) labeling foods with a "red light" if they contain
high levels of fat or sugar, 4) limiting the density of fast food restaurants in any neighborhood, 5)
requiring chain restaurants to offer "healthy" alternatives, and 6) eliminating junk food ads on
television shows aimed at children. Some advocates propose other regulatory interventions such
as 1) influencing the relative prices of healthy and unhealthy foods through taxes and/or subsidies
and 2) suing private industry for money damages as a way of blaming childhood obesity on certain
practices of the food industry (such as its marketing, product composition, or portion size
decisions). The food industry generally seeks to deflect blame for childhood obesity onto others,
such as parents and schools.
Proposal
We propose a radically different approach we call "per-
formance-based regulation". This policy strategy rests on
the moral argument that the food industry must take
responsibility for child obesity consequences that flow
from the consumption of the products from which they
profit. It is a regulatory intervention that seeks to harness
private initiative in pursuit of the public good. But it
resists telling industry specifically what to do to address
the problem. Instead, food companies are to be assigned
outcome improvements in the form of reduced childhood
obesity. Failure to achieve the regulatory target would
result in substantial financial penalties. The idea is to
align the economic interests of food companies with
sharply lower childhood obesity rates. Administratively,
food and beverage companies would be assigned a share
of the problem based on the overall share of the "bad cal-
ories" they sell. In order to make administrative oversight
practical, the regulated firms would be assigned specific
geographically clustered schools at which they will be
required to lower the obesity rate. Firms would be given a
reasonable period of time to phase in their childhood
obesity-reducing strategies.
The problem of childhood obesity
Childhood obesity is a large and growing problem in
many countries. In New South Wales, Australia, for exam-
ple, the obesity rate among schoolchildren has risen to
about 25% (one in four children), up from 11% two dec-
ades earlier [1-3]. Similarly, in the United States, the obes-
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35 years ago [4]. Sadly, while hunger remains a grave
problem for children in many places around the world, in
wealthier nations the opposite phenomenon is taking
center stage.
Both Australian and US studies have found childhood
obesity to be an important public health problem because
it leads to high rates of type 2 diabetes in children, as well
as high blood pressure – an early indicator of cardiovascu-
lar risk [5-7]. In 2007, the Australian Government priori-
tized obesity prevention as a National Health Priority
Area, ranking it alongside many of the diseases it contrib-
utes to, including cancer, cardiovascular disease and dia-
betes [2].
Currently, health promotion and prevention campaigns
are the preferred policy approach in Australia. This
includes regulations of television advertisements of
unhealthy foods/eating habits directed at children [7],
promoting leisure time sports and other activities for
youth [8], and food labeling programs such as the
National Heart Foundation's healthy "tick" program. [7].
Some argue, however, that major legislative and other reg-
ulatory measures are required [8,9]. But exactly which
public policy interventions have the best chance of
sharply lowering the proportion of children who become
obese? In the abstract, we know that obesity results from
too much caloric intake and too little exercise. But how
can society best help children keep these two factors in
better balance? At the moment, nobody really knows.
This is in marked contrast to the arena of tobacco control
– another serious public health problem throughout the
world. Studies show that policy interventions can make a
difference in the smoking rate through a combination of
actions, the most important of which appear to be 1) sub-
stantial cigarette taxes 2) tough regulation of the physical
spaces where smoking is permitted, and 3) aggressive pub-
licly sponsored counter-advertisements highlighting the
public fraud perpetrated by tobacco company executives
regarding the dangers of cigarettes and their addictive
quality [10]. Perhaps over time we will learn what works
best to contain childhood obesity as well, but we are not
there yet. It seems likely that the best public health
approach to obesity is prevention. After all, the very exist-
ence of a huge "diet industry" aimed at adults demon-
strates that losing weight may be at least as difficult as
quitting smoking. Put differently, an important parallel
between obesity and tobacco addiction is that, with both,
once afflicted, it is difficult to avert the danger, and that,
just as most smokers begin smoking as teenagers, a large
number of obese adults were already obese as children.
To be sure, it is not that people have no idea as to what to
do about childhood obesity [11]. And it is not that various
countries and localities are not trying out different strate-
gies [9]. Rather, the problem is that we (currently) lack
evidence as to what exactly will sharply reverse the alarm-
ing trend of recent years.
A new idea: performance-based regulation
We propose an approach we call performance-based regu-
lation. It is a regulatory intervention that seeks to harness
private initiative in pursuit of the public good. Briefly
stated, a regulatory agency assigns companies perform-
ance targets in the form of reduced harm to the public
health. The companies are not to be told specifically what
to do to address the problem, but can use whatever meth-
ods they found most effective and efficient. Failure to
achieve the regulatory target would result in substantial
financial penalties.
Performance-based regulation is increasingly becoming
the favored strategy for addressing other problems,
including, for example, certain pollution problems. On a
smaller regional scale, power plants are instructed that
only so much pollution may be emitted from their stacks,
with the amount lowered each year. It is left up to the
firms to figure out how best to achieve the regulatory out-
come goals [12]. On a much larger scale, with respect to
global warming, the growing consensus seems to be that
outcome goals should be imposed on nations, who must
then find the right solution for meeting their goals [13-
15]. In turn, countries are looking primarily to the busi-
ness sector to implement the most efficient mechanisms
to reduce society's overall carbon footprint.
Another example in the United States is the shifting of ele-
mentary and secondary schools to a performance-based
regulatory scheme. Under the No Child Left Behind Act,
schools are held accountable for achieving specified edu-
cational outcomes for their pupils, with legislators speci-
fying fewer input requirements (like class size, teacher
quality measures, etc.). Instead, under this law, it is up to
the schools to figure out how to solve the problem for
which they have been given responsibility [16]. Before
explaining how performance-based regulation could work
with respect to childhood obesity, we first discuss the
rationale underlying the approach, the possibility of its
political acceptance, and alternatives to it.
Framing childhood obesity as the responsibility 
of the food industry
Underlying performance-based regulation is the moral
argument that product-makers are, in large part, rightfully
responsible for the negative health consequences of the
products they sell. In the case of childhood obesity, the
food industry must take responsibility for the child obes-Page 2 of 9
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unhealthy products from which they profit.
As awareness of childhood obesity spreads, various inter-
ests fight over how this problem should be "framed"
[9,11]. The strategy of the food and beverage companies is
to frame this as a problem of personal choice and parental
failure [17]. Their narrative goes something like this: fam-
ilies are not taking responsibility for the health of their
children, and they should so do. Parents should make
sure their children exercise enough and do not eat too
much. No individual food or type of food should be
blamed, since it is all a matter of moderation. If parents do
not understand this, then it is the responsibility of doctors
and other health professionals to make it clear to them. As
for teenagers, schools should educate them as to the need
to eat and exercise properly. Almost any (proposed) regu-
lation beyond that is quickly equated with the "nanny"
state, in which public health fanatics step in to usurp (or
worse, to undermine) family responsibility, while at the
same time infringing on the freedom of responsible adults
[18,19].
By contrast, we believe public health strategists must
frame childhood obesity as centrally the responsibility of
Big Food, just as childhood smoking has been effectively
framed in many countries as the responsibility of Big
Tobacco. In the past, relying largely on parents to control
their children's smoking resulted in unacceptably high
teen smoking rates. More recently, public health activists
have blamed tobacco companies for marketing cigarettes
to children and have cast teen smokers (and their parents)
as victims. In this light, they paved the way for govern-
ment to intervene to change social norms about smoking
[20,21]. To this end, a range of measures were pursued
under the banner of holding Big Tobacco responsible.
But what precisely would it mean to frame childhood
obesity as the responsibility of Big Food? Our proposal
calls for performance-based regulation. This approach
orders the food and beverage industry to tackle and con-
tribute significantly to the solution of the problem its
products have created. What our plan demands of these
firms is results – reduced childhood obesity rates – leaving
it to them to figure out how best to achieve the socially
desired public health gains.
Politics
Performance-based regulation is likely to be opposed ini-
tially by both public health traditionalists and private
enterprise. The former generally distrust business and
tend to favor a "professionals-know-best" approach to
regulation. The latter fear lost profits and, as just noted,
are eager to frame childhood obesity as somebody else's
problem. Yet, in the hands of the right entrepreneurial
politicians, performance-based regulation could become
a compromise solution that triumphs over the alterna-
tives.
On one end of the political spectrum are those conserva-
tive leaders who follow the line of the food industry and
are ideologically inclined to treat childhood obesity as a
matter of personal responsibility of individual families.
But the reality in many countries is that obesity threatens
a gigantic health care cost burden that will fall on the
entire society. The same limited government intervention
with respect to childhood obesity of the sort that has
taken place over the past two decades will simply not suf-
fice. The parallel here to greenhouse gas emissions and cli-
mate change is striking. Even the most reactionary
national leaders are beginning to acknowledge that some
sort of collective action to fight global warming is
required.
On the other end of the political spectrum, political lead-
ers who are quite willing to back an activist approach to
public health problems confront two important chal-
lenges already noted with respect to childhood obesity.
First, there are no evidence-based policy interventions for
them to support that are reliably going to reduce child-
hood obesity rates in a significant way. Second, sensible
experimental interventions risk being immediately
labeled by opponents as "nanny" state strategies that
interfere with personal liberty.
Performance-based regulation can bridge this divide.
Government acts, but it does not tell business or consum-
ers what to do. Business is enlisted in support of the pub-
lic good and so can be cast in a positive light. The market
is relied upon, but society sets the goals for the market to
maximize. As already noted, this is just how leaders in
many parts of the world are now trying to confront cli-
mate change, and, as with global warming, if business
leaders realize that the political alternative is likely to be
government agencies telling them how to run their com-
panies, performance-based regulation can become far
more attractive.
Public health leaders may also come to appreciate that,
even though performance-based regulation may undercut
the political power of a few elite professionals, it should
nonetheless open up many opportunities for local public
health experts to consult with business on how to achieve
their childhood obesity targets.
Of course, the food industry will object to being the object
of regulation on the ground that food is hardly the only
cause of childhood obesity. Yet, one of the beauties of per-
formance-based regulation is that the food industry
would not be asked to eliminate the problem, but insteadPage 3 of 9
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ing is key. To win public support for performance-based
regulation, its supporters will probably first have to con-
vince opinion leaders that, because junk food companies
are profiting financially from selling products that harm
the health of our children, it is only fair to start by asking
those companies to do their share in reducing childhood
obesity.
Alternatives
Before explaining our scheme in detail, we want to con-
trast it with other approaches that rely on a similar fram-
ing which holds food companies responsible for
childhood obesity. First, people may hold food and bev-
erage companies responsible by successfully suing them
in product liability lawsuits based on tort law, thereby
obtaining money damages for obese children (a similar
approach has been tried, though not very satisfactorily in
our view, with respect to cigarettes [22-24]). The theory is
that tort litigation will expose misconduct by the food and
beverage industry (such as misrepresenting products as
healthy when they are not) and that tort law's deterrent
power will alter the behavior of food companies, thereby
lowering the childhood obesity rate.
However, there are serious drawbacks to this approach.
First, at the individual tort claim level, it will be nearly
impossible for obese children to lay responsibility at the
feet of any specific food or beverage company. After all,
almost everybody eats and drinks a variety of products
made by many different firms. Second, even if some
showing of wrongdoing could be proved, it is by no
means clear that eliminating the behaviors that the legal
system would be willing to label as "faulty" would make
significant headway on the childhood obesity problem.
Instead, tort law's doctrine of strict liability would have to
be radically expanded to hold food and beverage compa-
nies liable for the consequences of their products regard-
less of fault. Yet, common law courts in both Australia and
the United States have been unwilling to embrace this
position even as to tobacco [22].
A second very different approach to holding food and bev-
erage companies responsible is to adopt specific regula-
tory measures for curtailing irresponsible firm behavior,
perhaps also insisting on new behaviors that the regula-
tors believe should be engaged in by responsible compa-
nies. In a sense, this approach uses the legislature or an
administrative agency to pick out acts of commission or
omission that the judicial system might hold worthy of
tort liability. This traditional regulatory approach, termed
"command and control", has some advantages over tort
law. First, it does not require proving an individual causal
link to a specific child's obesity. Second, the prohibited
and required acts need not be cast as narrowly as would be
necessary to satisfy the conventional standards of negli-
gence law. Yet, as already noted, the problem with this
approach is that regulators do not actually know what
changes to industry behavior would make significant
advances toward achieving the ultimate social goal –
lower childhood obesity rates.
A third approach to childhood obesity takes its cue from
tobacco control, by trying to change behaviors through
price effects [25]. This entails making junk food that chil-
dren eat much more expensive while sharply reducing the
price of the healthier food they should be eating. A
straightforward approach would be to levy high taxes on
junk foods generally and use the proceeds to subsidize the
supply of nutritious food. Imposing the tax could be
framed as a way of holding junk food sellers responsible.
This approach could be tailored to target products heavily
consumed by children, such as sugared breakfast cereals
and the candy and chips consumed by teens during or just
after school hours. Since childhood obesity is, alas, dis-
proportionately a problem for children from lower
income families in both Australia and the United States
[6,11], another price-change strategy might be to offer tar-
get subsidies of healthier food to the poor. In the United
States, the "food stamps" program currently provides low-
income households with electronic debit cards to use for
the purchase of eat-at-home foods. Hence, one policy idea
is that when the card is used to buy healthy foods, the
cardholder should be charged only a share of the cost,
whereas when unhealthy food is bought, the cardholder
could be charged extra [27].
Notice, however, that, as with the command and control
proposals described above, this price-influencing strategy
is aimed essentially at inputs, not outcomes. Nothing
about the policy interventions actually requires that fewer
children wind up obese. Rather, it is simply assumed or
hoped that these sorts of strategies will result in obesity
prevention.
Our proposed strategy, performance-based regulation, is
quite different. It insists on results. It does not depend on
"experts" or government actors to know or decide what
are the most promising changes to order. It leaves that up
to the regulated parties to decide. What it asks of them is
success in the form of changed outcomes – in this case,
obesity prevention as measured by reduced childhood
obesity rates. Rather than tort law, rather than tax and sub-
sidy schemes, and rather than specific input-oriented
command and control requirements, the regulatory
scheme would instead demand outcomes.Page 4 of 9
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childhood obesity
We propose a regime of performance-based regulation of
sellers of non-nutritious food [28]. As already noted,
because junk food consumption is one central cause of
childhood obesity, we think the most promising first step
is to persuade opinion leaders that food sellers may be
fairly asked to take responsibility for the consequences of
their products. Also, we focus on children for two reasons.
First, it is difficult to argue that they, as compared with
adults, are making mature judgments about what and
how much to eat [29]. Second, because we believe that
prevention is far more promising than weight loss, it
makes sense to start when people are young and before
they are overweight.
Some have suggested that the parties being regulated need
not be the food and beverage companies. Why not par-
ents? Why not schools? Or states? We find those variations
less attractive. For one thing, this undermines the original
framing goal of casting childhood obesity as the responsi-
bility of the food companies that sell junk food. For
another, direct financial penalties of schools or parents
who do not meet their goals would be offensive in ways
that penalties imposed on businesses might not be.
(Indeed, unlike parents or public schools, businesses
would be able to treat such penalties like a tax that could
be passed on in the price of the bad food they sell.)
As already noted, we do not insist that food-sellers elimi-
nate childhood obesity. This concession serves both to
acknowledge that such a goal would be too ambitious and
that other factors contribute to childhood obesity.
Instead, we recommend a regulatory goal of a 50% reduc-
tion over 10 years. Were that achieved, it would be an
enormous public health gain and would return nations to
the childhood obesity rates they had decades ago.
(a) Determining which food companies are covered
We would allow a year from the time the plan is adopted
until it goes into effect. One reason for this delay is that it
would take the regulatory agency in charge some time to
put the scheme into place. First, the agency would have to
determine which food-sellers are covered. We do not pro-
pose imposing this form of regulation on all food-sellers.
After all, some food is healthy and nutritious. Instead we
direct the regulatory scheme at sellers of "bad food",
defining bad food as that which derives either 40% of its
calories from sugar or 30% of its calories from fat. These
definitions are roughly equivalent to those used by other
health advocates in defining junk food.
Another purpose of the delay is to permit some bad food-
makers to reformulate their product so as to remove it
from the regulated category. Some might be concerned
that bright-line thresholds give firms an incentive to refor-
mulate products so that they just barely avoid regulation,
say, by lowering the fat level to 29% or the sugar to 39%.
Yet, widespread action of this sort alone could lead to
important public health gains. Moreover, even if the regu-
lator does not consider this a substantial enough gain, it
could choose to start with lower thresholds.
Our plan would exempt smaller firms because they would
be too numerous to keep a regulatory eye on. However,
many food products sold by small firms would nonethe-
less be included in the regime. This is because of the way
responsibility for bad food is assigned. A manufacturer of
bad food carrying the manufacturer's name (like Coca-
Cola) would have responsibility for that product, whether
sold through retailers, in restaurants, or the like. Large
retailers (like supermarkets – Coles and Woolworths in
Australia – and fast food chains like McDonald's every-
where) would be responsible for all the bad food they sell
that is not associated with large brand-name manufactur-
ers. Hence, the only bad food that would escape assign-
ment to a participating firm would be that made by small
firms and sold through small firms. Were this thought a
serious problem, it might be addressed by assigning the
responsibility for such foods to the large distributors who
serve as middlemen in the food chain.
(b) Determining how much of the problem each company 
responsible for
The next job is to determine the market share of the cov-
ered bad food held by each covered seller. For these pur-
poses we would include all bad food unless the seller can
demonstrate that it is not marketed to children and that its
consumption by children is de minimus. Moreover, we
would then presume, for ease of administration, that chil-
dren eat proportionately the same share of each covered
food as do adults. Were this presumption thought to be
significantly unfair to a substantial number of food com-
panies, more administrative effort could be put into deter-
mining the bad food market with respect to children and
the shares held by each covered seller.
The overall bad food market probably should not be
defined by price or sheer volume, however. Rather, we
suggest defining it in terms of the total amount of bad cal-
ories. For example, if 80% of the calories in a bottle of
Pepsi come from sugar, then the calories it contains
beyond the 40% cut-off for inclusion in the plan would be
deemed bad calories. In this way, the more a product
exceeds the nutritional baseline for regulation, the greater
share of the bad calorie market is assigned to it. Once the
total amount of bad calories contributed by all covered
products is determined, a proportionate share of that total
could be assigned to each product. Then, the various prod-
ucts sold by each participating seller can be aggregated,Page 5 of 9
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its share of the overall market in bad food.
Hypothetically – and merely for purposes of illustration –
suppose that major sellers wind up with these sorts of
shares of overall responsibility: Coca-Cola 10%, Pepsico
10%, Unilever 5%, McDonald's 5%, Nestle 5%, Cadbury
5%, and so on. It seems clear to us, however, that if Coca-
Cola were, for example, deemed to be responsible for 10%
of the childhood obesity problem it cannot be directed to
solve 10% of the problem for every child in the nation
because the regulatory agency could never tell whether or
not Coca-Cola had achieved its goal. This is in contrast to
the possible use of performance-based regulation, say, to
reduce highway fatality rates. There, if Toyota were told,
for example, to reduce by 25% the number of people
killed on the roads while in Toyota-made vehicles, the rel-
evant agency could readily measure whether or not Toyota
had achieved its regulatory target.
Therefore, when it comes to childhood obesity, we have
had to develop a different strategy. Instead of asking Coca-
Cola to take partial responsibility for keeping slim all the
targeted children, we think it would be much more sensi-
ble to assign specific pools of children to Coca-Cola for
whom that enterprise would be 100% responsible. In this
way we would measure Coca-Cola's success in terms of
obesity rate changes among their assigned pool of chil-
dren (who would make up 10% of the relevant popula-
tion assuming Coca-Cola is deemed responsible for 10%
of the problem).
We propose doing this by assigning each regulated firm a
set of geographically clustered schools, and, in turn, the
pupils who attend those schools. For example, in Aus-
tralia, Coca-Cola might be assigned all the schools in
Queensland, or in the United States, all the schools in four
or five states in the southeast where it has its national
headquarters.
After further consideration, we decided it would be best
not to include all schools in the scheme. Instead we pro-
pose to focus the plan only on schools with existing obes-
ity rates that are higher than the end-of-plan target obesity
rate. For example, assume that a nation's current child-
hood obesity rate is 16%, and that the goal for schoolchil-
dren generally is 8% at the end of 10 years. On this
assumption, we suggest that only schools that already
have obesity rates above 8% would be included. Generally
speaking, these schools would tend to have dispropor-
tionately more children from lower income families, and
that would protect the plan from the risk that firms might
otherwise elect to concentrate their efforts primarily on
children from more affluent families.
(c) Measuring success
Notice that under our proposal the regime would not
track specific children. Indeed, children who are in the
second year of school or higher at the time the plan first
goes into effect would probably be out of school by the
end of the regulatory period and would not be counted
then. Rather, at the start of the scheme, most of the chil-
dren who will be targeted by participating firms would be
either six years old or younger or not yet born. From a pre-
vention strategy, then, the regulated firms would have a
clear incentive to focus not only on primary school chil-
dren, but perhaps more importantly on pre-schoolers,
and to keep a large share of them from becoming obese in
the first place. To be sure, as those children age, firms
would have to make an effort to maintain those children's
non-obese status. Hence, over time, a firm would follow
the children for whom it is responsible as they pass from
primary schools to their geographically related secondary
schools.
While other ways of defining "success" are clearly possi-
ble, we recommend focusing on a simple yes/no criterion
that would use an agreed upon body-mass-index (BMI),
the current standard measure of obesity in the profession
and the basis on which the prevalence rates quoted earlier
are calculated. This means that a firm would get no credit
for a child who is just slightly obese and would get full
credit for one who is just barely non-obese. Probably,
however, a large share of the target children would be well
on either side of the line, and to be safe, participating
firms would have an incentive to have as many of its chil-
dren as possible well below the cut-off BMI.
Under our proposal, the scheme would not wait 10 years
to see whether participating firms had achieved their
goals. On the other hand, we think that it would be inap-
propriate to insist on immediate results, as it might take
the regulated firms a while to organize their campaign,
begin to learn what interventions show promise, and so
on. Hence, we propose that no penalties apply until the
end of the fourth year of the plan.
(d) Later modifications to the scheme
For now we leave open the question of what should be
done after the end of the tenth year. If the plan were a suc-
cess, it might be quite desirable to carry it forward. If noth-
ing else, that would imply a re-determination of the bad
food market and individual firms' market shares, as those
probably would have shifted somewhat over time – as
new products enter the market, as some firms restructure
their products to be outside the bad food definition, and
as consumption patterns change. Also, some previously
exempt firms might grow large enough to be covered in a
subsequent cycle. Furthermore, policy-makers by then
might decide to re-define bad food. Perhaps a lowerPage 6 of 9
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complex definition would be adopted. Perhaps other sorts
of firms could also be included in the regulatory process;
for example, firms whose products contribute to the exces-
sively sedentary lifestyle of many children.
In addition, experience gained during the first ten years
would help determine the appropriate targets for a second
cycle. Might it be reasonable to ask firms to reduce child-
hood obesity rates even further, perhaps down to 5%
from 8%? Would it be thought sufficient merely to insist
that an 8% rate be maintained (assuming the goal of the
first cycle were achieved)? Also, perhaps a different set of
schools would be included in a subsequent cycle.
Moreover, we acknowledge that it might turn out that per-
formance-based regulation was not very successful in
achieving the obesity reduction goals we hoped for, in
which case it might well be wise to attempt a different reg-
ulatory scheme. However, if government were to try our
scheme, it should do so for a full initial cycle and commit
at the outset, as firmly as possible, to sticking with the
plan for the full ten years. Otherwise, the risk is that firms
will not take their responsibilities seriously and will
instead focus their political energy on overturning the
plan.
To be sure, by the end of the first ten years we will have a
lot more information about which intervention strategies
seem successful at preventing childhood obesity and
which do not seem to work very well. This will tempt
some of those with governmental power to simply order
the adoption of those successful interventions after year
ten (or even earlier), rather than to engage in a new round
of performance-based regulation. We are not sure this
would be wise, however.
One of the key assumptions underlying our strategy is that
regulated firms will experiment with different approaches,
will begin to learn which work better, will learn from each
other, and will thus move towards efficient and effective
means for dealing with the childhood obesity problem. If
this approach works well, that might be a very good rea-
son for continuing with it. After all, even if techniques A
and B seemed very successful in the first ten years, maybe
firms will learn that methods C and D are even better, or
better for dealing with still lower obesity targets that may
be imposed later on. The problem with command and
control schemes is that, in prescribing particular meas-
ures, we risk that regulators will impose outdated technol-
ogy.
(e) Setting a penalty
What if firms fail to meet their obesity-reduction targets?
For performance-based regulation to have teeth, enter-
prises falling short of their obligations must be penalized.
This will be a monetary fine, which, in effect, becomes a
tax. As noted already, we would begin penalties after the
fourth year of firm participation and continue penalties
through the end of the first ten-year cycle. In our proposal,
firms would continue to have the target number of obese
children in the schools in their jurisdiction reduced each
year. This means that, if they fall short of their goal at any
point, in the following year they will have to make up the
shortfall in addition to achieving the next year's required
gain to get back on schedule.
The amount of the penalty should be set at a level which
makes it financially more attractive for a firm to invest in
obesity prevention than simply to pay the fine for non-
compliance. Of course, it is not socially desirable to prod
firms to spend excessively on obesity prevention,
although there would surely be debate over what is exces-
sive. In theory, spending should be encouraged up to the
level of the social benefit achieved by prevention. Assum-
ing increasing marginal costs of obesity prevention, if the
chosen per-child penalty equaled the per-child average
social cost and the target reduction were set at what could
be cost-effectively achieved, a rational participating firm
would be enticed to invest up to the efficient level of pre-
vention, would achieve that outcome, and would not pay
a penalty.
In practice, however, it will not be possible to determine
in advance the precise social cost and prevention cost.
Therefore, both the efficient penalty and the efficient level
of investment it induces are also unknown. In turn, the
obesity reduction target we propose may be too meager or
too ambitious. In response to this problem, our view is
that, where necessary, the plan should overreach with
respect to both the target and the penalty. If the target is
set too high, we may be able to learn how much is reason-
ably possible, especially if the penalty is also too high.
This, in effect, stimulates the regulated firms to explore
and reveal a larger portion of their cost curve. Otherwise,
if the target is too low we risk having them simply stop
when they reach the target even if it would be socially
desirable and economically efficient to reduce obesity
rates further. So too, a low penalty might in fact be lower
than the social cost, inducing firms to quit before reaching
the efficient level of prevention.
To be sure, if the penalty is too high and the target level
too ambitious, firms might inefficiently over-invest in pre-
vention; but how bad would this be? And if the costs of
prevention at some point exceed the penalty amount, the
upshot would be that were a firm still below its target, it
would from there on simply pay the penalty. At that point
our plan would be converted into one that imposes a tax
on bad food, which ought to be socially attractive in itsPage 7 of 9
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would be internalized into its price.
(f) Freedom to choose how to reach target
As emphasized several times already, performance-based
regulation insists on results, but leaves it up to the regu-
lated parties to decide what obesity-reducing strategies to
employ. If school officials would be effective in enticing
children to remain non-obese, under our plan the regu-
lated firms could team up with the schools for which they
are responsible to take advantage of that approach. Or, if
it were more effective to reach out to children and families
themselves outside the school setting, or to attack the
problem via television or changes in the children's envi-
ronment, firms would have the flexibility to pursue this
method. These firms, after all, unlike governmental bod-
ies or families, are in the business of pursuing results
while keeping costs down.
It is critical to appreciate that under our proposal a firm
like Coca-Cola has no special incentive to reduce con-
sumption of its products nationwide or even to reduce the
sugar in its products. First, Coca-Cola would not get any
credit for any social benefit that might occur outside its
geographic area of responsibility. Also, Coca-Cola may
well want to pursue the idea that children under its
responsibility can be non-obese and still consume its
products in amounts they do today. And, so far as our
plan is concerned, that outcome would be fine. On the
other hand, it might be that Coca-Cola and its major
sweetened beverage competitors who are regulated by the
plan would want to get together to agree on some national
strategy that would benefit each of them in the geographic
area where they are regulated. To the extent permitted by
antitrust laws, all of the firms might agree, for example, on
reductions in the size of sweetened beverage portions sold
and served to children.
Moreover, to the extent that the regulated firms believe
public policy changes are necessary, they can jointly lobby
for those reforms; thus, the political efforts of the regu-
lated firms would be aligned with public health goals
instead of being focused on profits for the enterprise, as
they are now. This means there is reason to expect that the
regulated firms would more willingly cooperate with local
public health officials than they do now. At present, busi-
ness efforts said to be advancing public health are all too
often disguised marketing campaigns or "voluntary" strat-
egies aimed at precluding coercive regulation. But if per-
formance-based regulation were put in place, businesses
would need to achieve actual public health gains and, to
the extent that local public health experts made good part-
ners, they should be eagerly sought out.
A potential pitfall of performance-based regulation is that
it can entice firms to act in ways that are not socially desir-
able. Therefore, the agency in charge of administering the
program would have to be empowered to ban certain
practices and to penalize firms that acted in socially per-
verse ways. One concern with all performance-based strat-
egies is that the objective that is being measured is not
actually the precise social goal. This raises the question of
whether a certain BMI level is actually what is desired or
whether some other definition of obesity or poor health
would be a better goal; were the latter true, firms would be
striving for the wrong outcome. A second concern is that
firms might seek to push some obese children out of the
schools in their target pool. A third concern is that firms
might press children in their pool to engage in dangerous
activities in order to keep from becoming obese. After all,
we do not want to promote eating disorders through this
scheme.
For this reason, we recommend that firms be required to
disclose to the regulatory agency the nature of their plans
to deal with the obesity rates of the children in their pool.
This would allow the agency to veto socially unacceptable
strategies. While this is a different role from that which
many public health agencies traditionally play, we think it
is a role for which regulatory agencies, when properly
staffed, are well suited. After all, government has lots of
experience with somewhat analogous problems, such as
the regulation of child abuse and neglect by those (parents
and organizations) having custody of children. In any
event, the risk that firms would embrace socially perverse
strategies should not be exaggerated. Note well that the
lengthy duration of the regulatory cycle provides an incen-
tive for firms to introduce children to sustainable weight-
control strategies that would stave off obesity for years,
not months.
Conclusion
Compared with traditional alternatives, performance-
based regulation is a promising new approach to tackling
the growing problem of childhood obesity. Although we
have designed and described our plan as though it would
be adopted as a national scheme covering, say, all of Aus-
tralia, in populous enough countries we could imagine it
being adopted regionally on an experimental basis. For
example, in the United States, California alone might go
for the performance-based regulation strategy.
While our proposal will cost public money to administer,
it is likely that not all firms will reach their obesity-reduc-
tion targets and will pay penalties. Those payments can
first be used to support activities of the regulatory agency.
On the other hand, if our plan is so successful as to result
in but a few or even zero penalties being imposed, then it
will have been an enormous public health success. In thatPage 8 of 9
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event, surely it would be worth paying for the administra-
tive costs of the scheme out of general revenues.
Performance-based regulation also presents regulated
firms with certain advantages. For example, we believe
that from the perspective of corporate image, a firm would
much prefer to have the bragging rights that come from
reducing childhood obesity rates in the area of its respon-
sibility than the shame that often comes from being suc-
cessfully sued in tort. So, too, we think that firms would
prefer the flexibility of preventing childhood obesity in
ways they think best rather than taking specific orders
from government regulators.
Our goal here has been to present the case for perform-
ance-based regulation and its potential application to the
public health problem of childhood obesity. We have
tried to acknowledge some potential problems with our
approach, while emphasizing our belief that they are out-
weighed by its advantages (as well as offering our view
that many potential problems can be avoided or mini-
mized by careful drafting of the plan's details). In the end,
perhaps the most attractive aspect of performance-based
regulation is its "third way" solution – avoiding the
greater problems that come from either relying entirely on
the market or relying on government experts to dictate in
detail how businesses should act.
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